Donald
Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is a
turning point in the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict.
However, the issue is much bigger than Palestine as Donald Trump may
have just lit the match that will set off the powder keg of the Arab
World.
by
Eric Draitser
Part
3 - A region at war
Though
it is often seen in a vacuum, the Palestine issue cannot be divorced
from the broader dynamics of the region. And, given the heightened
tensions and turmoil in the Middle East – the war in Syria,
Saudi-Qatar conflict, the war in Yemen, the Islamic State’s rise,
etc. – Palestinian resistance must be examined as part of a broader
regional transformation.
Hezbollah
has for years been seen by many, especially the Israeli state, as a
principal belligerent on the side of Palestinians. Since 2006 and
Hezbollah’s resounding victory over Israeli military forces, the
organization has become perhaps the primary force for armed
resistance against Israel. As such, the organization would
undoubtedly have a vital role to play in any potential resistance.
But questions remain about Hezbollah’s capabilities in the wake of
its intervention in Syria and, to a lesser degree, Yemen.
According
to a survey of news coverage of Hezbollah fighter funerals, more than
1,000 Hezbollah fighters were killed in combat in Syria in the four
and a half years of Hezbollah’s involvement (September 2012 –
April 2017). As Ali Alfoneh, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council
noted:
This
number [1000 killed]…must be treated as an absolute minimum, since
the Hezbollah leadership has every reason to downplay losses. Giving
full information on number of killed would increase domestic
(Lebanese) resistance to Hezbollah’s involvement and reveal more
information about its forces to its adversaries… Of these Hezbollah
fighters, 60 were identified as al-Qaid al-Shahid (martyred
commander) or al-Qaid al-Maydani (field commander), which
distinguishes them from the rank-and-file members of the Shia
militia.
Aside
from demonstrating how much blood Hezbollah has shed on the
battlefields of Syria, the death toll indicates that, at the very
least, Hezbollah’s battlefield leadership has been significantly
impacted by the losses. Naturally, new commanders rise to take the
place of their fallen leaders but, as any general could tell you,
it’s not easy to replace competent field commanders. Indeed, some
of those leaders were veterans of the 2006 campaign against Israel,
and it remains an open question whether that experience can truly be
replaced.
Of
course, Hezbollah has also been actively involved in Yemen — if not
in military actions, then certainly as advisers. According to a 2015
Financial Times exclusive, Hezbollah sources in Beirut were quoted as
saying that Houthi fighters had “trained with us in Iran, then
we trained them here and in Yemen,” and that Iran was
“probably” supplying weapons to the Houthis. One Hezbollah
source told the FT that “We are the guerrilla experts, so we
give advice about the best timings to strike back, when to hold
back.”
While
these points are disputed by some in the organization and its
supporters, the fact remains that Houthi capabilities, to say nothing
of tactical victories, owe much to Hezbollah as a role model, if not
a direct mentor.
As Paul
Salem — Vice President for Policy Analysis Research, and Programs
at the Middle East Institute — noted recently:
Hezbollah
has been building up its presence in Yemen and Secretary-General
Hassan Nasrallah has raised the Houthi cause and the war against
Saudi Arabia there as a main cause of Hezbollah in recent speeches.
Hezbollah’s role in the missile that was launched at Riyadh on
November 4 only punctuated the threat. Saudi Arabia fears that
Hezbollah and Iran could build missile systems that threaten the
kingdom from Yemen as they have done against Israel from Lebanon.
So, it
seems that the war in Yemen, like that in Syria, has implications for
the Palestinian resistance. While it’s highly unlikely that Yemen
has drained much in terms of material resources from Hezbollah, that
conflict has made Hezbollah into a direct belligerent against Saudi
Arabia, a significant escalation from the indirect proxy conflict in
Syria.
The
implications for Palestine should be self-evident: why would Saudi
Arabia, and MBS specifically, allow Hezbollah to become the leading
edge of a fight against Israel when the organization remains the
leading edge of the ongoing conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran in
both Syria and, to a lesser extent, Yemen? The contradiction here
makes it apparent that, in the context of Palestine, any appearance
of unity would be mere window-dressing. Beneath the surface, these
forces would remain in conflict.
Also,
one has to wonder whether MBS would attempt to extricate himself from
the self-created quagmire in Yemen by using Palestine as a bargaining
chip. Might Riyadh make a backroom deal wherein they sell out the
Palestinian resistance in exchange for political and/or military
support from the U.S. in Yemen? This would make some sense given
President Trump’s recent comments urging the Saudis to end the
blockade of Yemen, a statement widely regarded as an indication that
Washington’s political cover for Saudi war crimes was wearing thin.
Could we see a renewed backing from Washington in exchange for
non-interference in any Palestinian uprising? It is a definite
possibility.
And,
given the recent news of the death of former Yemeni President Saleh,
the chances of an escalated war against the Houthis have grown
exponentially. The Saudis will need U.S. political cover and
military/logistical support to prosecute their war.
Not to
be forgotten, the ongoing diplomatic conflict between Saudi Arabia
and Qatar complicates the situation in Palestine further. As
mentioned above, the financial and political backing that each has
provided to the Palestinian Authority and Hamas respectively will
undoubtedly spill over into a proxy conflict in Palestine, one that
could torpedo any chance of a truly unified resistance to Israeli
oppression and occupation.
Of
course, one cannot forget Turkey’s ongoing war against the Kurds,
and the criminal networks and death squads operating under the
Islamic State banner that have been decimated in recent months. The
latter is particularly crucia,l as southern Lebanon had become a
major battleground against ISIS fighters, which culminated in the
controversial agreement between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government
and ISIS to provide safe passage for more than 300 ISIS militants and
their families.
All
these factors complicate the picture of a unified Palestinian
resistance. Do they make it impossible? Of course not. However, it
must be understood that any uprising in Palestine is connected to,
and not divorced from, the politics of the region.
But what
of the global players, specifically China and Russia? How might they
factor into this increasingly complicated mosaic of political
relations?
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